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successful. 3 If a stronger restriction. is placed on the present
freedom to search without a warrant, the discarding of the
Rule will be a small loss to criminal constitutional law.
Securities Regulation-Torts: Accountant's
Liability for Nondisclosure
Early in 1964 Yale Express System, Inc. engaged defendant-
accountants to audit the financial statements that the corpora-
tion intended to include in its annual stockholders' report.
Shortly thereafter defendant also undertook to conduct "special
studies" of the corporation's past and current income and ex-
penses. On March 31, 1964, defendant, acting as an independent
public accountant, certified the figures contained in the financial
statements.1 On April 9, 1964, the corporation issued the annual
report containing this certification, and shortly thereafter filed a
report with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)2
that also contained the certified figures. However, defendant
subsequently discovered that the figures certified in the annual
report were substantially false and misleading,3 but failed to
disclose this discovery until the results of the "special studies"
were released on May 5, 1965. Plaintiffs, 4 who had purchased
securities at a false and inflated price in reliance upon the cor-
poration's annual report, brought suit for damages, alleging,
inter alia, that defendant was liable for fraud and deceit both at
53. Note, Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on
the Fourth Amendment, 28 U. CHr. L. REv. 664, 702-06 (1961).
1. Yale was required to have its annual report certified by an
independent public accountant since its securities were registered on a
national stock exchange. Securities Exchange Act § 13(a) (2), 48 Stat.
894 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (2) (1964).
2. The filing of this report, called the Form 10-K Report, is re-
quired by the Securities Exchange Act § 13, 48 Stat. 894 (1934), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1964), and regulations promulgated there-
under, 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (1967).
3. In the capacity of an independent public accountant, an ac-
countant has a primary obligation to the public investors. Touche,
Niven, Bailey & Smart, 37 S.E.C. 629, 670-71 (1957); McKesson & Rob-
bins, SEC Accounting Release No. 19, at 30 (1940). However, in handling
the corporation's special studies, defendant acted as a dependent public
accountant whose primary obligation was to its employer. Defendant
thus faced conflicting and mutually inconsistent obligations. 266 F.
Supp. at 183.
4. A previous opinion allowed a class action to be maintained on
behalf of all those who purchased Yale's securities between August 20,




common law and under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 19345 and Rule 10b-56 promulgated thereunder for failure
to immediately disclose the post-certification discovery of the
report's falsity.7 Defendant moved to dismiss for failure to state
a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Federal Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York held that
plaintiffs were entitled to prove their action either at common
law or under section 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5.8 Fischer v. Kletz,
266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
Although the common law action of deceit existed as early
as 1201, 9 the greater part of the law that has developed has not
been particularly applicable to the relatively modern practices of
5. Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate com-
merce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securi-
ties exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange
*. . , any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1964).
6. Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,
by the use of any means of instrumentality of interstate com-
merce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securi-
ties exchange,(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or
to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Rule lOb-5].
7. Plaintiffs also alleged that defendants were liable (1) under§ 18 of the Exchange Act, 48 Stat. 897 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78r (1964), (2) under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 for failure to disclose
the falsity contained in Yale's interim reports, and (3) under § 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 for "aiding and abetting" Yale by encouraging the use
of Yale's own figures, allegedly known to be false.
8. The court summarily rejected the motion to dismiss the portion
of the complaint alleging a § 18 violation because it involved purely a
factual dispute. 266 F. Supp. at 189. The court also held that although
it appeared that no cause of action existed as to the defendant's actions
involving the interim statements, plaintiffs should have a chance to
further develop the facts through discovery. 266 F. Supp. at 194-97.
9. 2 F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, ISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 535 (2d
ed. 1923) (citing Select Civil Pleas, pL 111 (A.D. 1201)); W. PRossER,
TORTS 699 (3d ed. 1964); 1 T. STREET, FouNDATioNs OF LEGAL Limnrr y
375 (1906); P. Wn IE'LD, TORTS 548 (7th ed. 1963).
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accountancy and securities floatation. Rather than establishing
a comprehensive treatment of fraud in these areas, the courts
have applied general contract and tort law.10 The results have
been an incorporation of uncertain subjective standards" and
common law limitations inappropriate to modern practices.12
The original action of deceit was limited to direct parties to a
transaction 13 and required a showing of intent.' 4 Thus a merely
negligent misrepresentation was not; actionable.' 5 In addition,
since the action of deceit developed at a time when business
philosophy emphasized the individual's freedom of contract,16
the doctrine of caveat emptor'7 was instrumental in curtailing
liability for nondisclosure. Relief was limited to cases involving
an affirmative misrepresentation.' Finally, although common
10. Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 YALE. L.J.
227, 227-28 (1933).
11. One element of a deceit cause of action has traditionally been
intent to defraud. See note 14 infra. In numerous situations proof of
a defendant's intent is hardly possible with any degree of certainty.
Similarly, whether plaintiff's reliance on defendant's statement was
justified is determined partly by an examination of the individual's own
mental capacity and knowledge. W. PRossEaR, supra note 9, at 732.
12. See Shulman, supra note 10, at 228-42, for a thorough discussion
of the limitations of the common law.
13. See, e.g., Roswel v. Vaughan, 79 Eng. Rep. 171 (Ex. 1607). The
best explanation for this limitation is that the earlier courts probably
considered a deceit action to be appropriate only in cases involving
contractual relations. W. PROSSER, supra note 9, at 699.
14. Intent, in this sense, is an intent to induce reliance on a mis-
leading impression. The crucial element is the state of the speaker's
mind, and an honest belief in the truth of a representation was generally
a good defense. See Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889). See gen-
erally W. PROSSER, supra note 9, at 715-19. The other elements of the
cause of action include the defendant's false representation of a material
fact, plaintiff's justifiable reliance, and damage to the plaintiff. See,
e.g., C.W. Denning & Co. v. Suncrest Lumber Co., 51 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.
1931); Wishnick v. Frye, 111 Cal. App. 926, 245 P.2d 532 (1952).
15. See Ultramares v. Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 194 N.E.
441 (1931); Landell v. Lybrand, 264 Pa. 406, 107 A. 783 (1919); Derry
v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889). See also Note, The Limitations on the
Action for Negligent Misrepresentation-The Ultramares Case, 31 COLmV.
L. REV. 858 (1931).
16. Keeton, Fraud-Concealment & Nondisclosure, 15 TEXAS L. REV.
1, 31 (1936).
17. See H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933). The Presi-
dent's demand to Congress then was "let the seller also beware."
18. See Crowell v. Jackson, 53 N.J.L. 656, 23 A. 426 (1891); Peek
v. Gurney, [1873] L.R. 6 H.L. 377; Keates v. The Earl of Cadogan, 138
Eng. Rep. 234 (C.R. 1851). This treatneLt is similar to the distinctions
made by the courts between nonfeasance and misfeasance. Thus, since
no liability existed for a failure to act in normal circumstances, complete
silence would not be actionable. But, just as liability could be imposed
o(i ?a actor for action undertaken but not completed, so also would a
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law remedies other than a deceit action presented promising al-
ternatives, 19 in practice, the remedies were greatly restricted.20
Faced with these precedents, the courts were forced either to
leave wronged investors with inadequate remedies or to make
exceptions to fit the new business practices of the twentieth
century, often leaving the law in a confused state in the proc-
ess.
21
In an attempt to fill the gap left by inadequate common law
remedies 22 and to give direction to the law, Congress passed the
Securities Act 23 and the Exchange Act.24  As a result of these
Acts the duty in securities transactions of such experts as ac-
countants, previously limited solely to the employer, was ex-
speaker be liable if, once he had spoken, he did not disclose the whole
truth. Compare Gates v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 185 Ky. 24, 213 S.W. 564
(1919), and Nelson v. Schultz, 170 Misc. 681, 11 N.Y.S.2d 184 (Sup. Ct.
1939), and Bascho v. Pennsylvania R.R., 3 N.J. Super. 86, 65 A.2d 613
(App. Div. 1949), with Newell v. Randall, 32 Minn. 171, 19 N.W. 972
(1884), and Smith v. Pope, 103 N.H. 555, 176 A.2d 321 (1961), and Berry
v. Stevens, 168 Okla. 124, 31 P.2d 950 (1934).
19. Alternative remedies included rescission or warranty. See
Shulman, supra note 10, at 228-29; Note, The Prospects for Rule X-lOb-5:
An Emerging Remedy for Defrauded Investors, 59 YALE L.J. 1120, 1123
(1950) [hereinafter cited as Prospects].
20. In a rescission action, plaintiff was required to be able to re-
turn the certificates, e.g., Sedden v. North E. Salt Co., [1905] 1 Ch.
326, and was subject to such defenses as waiver, e.g., Brennan v. National
Equitable Inv. Co., 247 N.Y. 486, 160 N.E. 924 (1928), and laches, e.g.,
Maginess v. Western Sec. Corp., 38 Cal. App. 56, 175 P. 277 (1918), and
was faced with problems of privity. See generally Shulman, supra note
10, at 231-32.
Similarly, in a warranty action, the remedy was strictly limited
when applied to securities transactions. See Henderson v. Plymouth Oil
Co., 13 F.2d 932 (W.D. Pa. 1926) (required to show intent to warrant);
Goodwyn v. Folds, 30 Ga. App. 204, 112 S.E. 335 (1923); Burwash v.
Ballou, 230 Ill. 34, 82 N.E. 355 (1907) (no warranty implied as to quality
or value of stock); Heilbut v. Buckleton, [1913] A.C. 30.
21. The privity doctrine, for example, was first abandoned as to
deceit in Pasley v. Freeman, 100 Eng. Rep. 450 (K.B. 1789). Confusion
exists when courts attempt to extend the Pasley rule to cases of merely
negligent misrepresentation. Compare Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236,
135 N.E. 275 (1922), with Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co., [1951] 2
K.B. 164. Thus, an accountant was liable solely to his employer for a
negligent misrepresentation. In the leading case of Ultramares v.
Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 194 N.E. 441 (1931), the court further
confused the situation by ruling that negligence sufficiently gross would
constitute actionable deceit, and the accountant, in this case, would then
be liable to third parties.
22. See Shulman, supra note 10, at 227; Prospects, supra note 19, at
1123.
23. 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1964).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1964).
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tended to include the investing public as well.25 Defrauded in-
vestors were allowed to recover under specific statutory provi-
sions 26 rather than under the common law. However, these
new remedies still did not provide investors with complete pro-
tection.2 7  Consequently, the SEC published rules pursuant to
these Acts in an attempt to provide more complete protection.
Included in this promulgation was Rule 10b-5 which was pub-
lished in conformity with section 10 (b), the Exchange Act's gen-
eral "antifraud" provision.28
Although section 10(b) does not specifically provide for
civil liability, the courts have consistently construed it to con-
tain an implied cause of action.29 In addition, the courts have
imposed higher standards of disclosure in section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 actions than originally imposed by the common law. 0
The greatest limitation still facing the defrauded investor has
been the attempt by some courts to read into section 10(b) a
requirement of privity,31 but this view has increasingly been re-
25. Touche, Niven, Bailey & Smart, 37 S.E.C. 629, 670-71 (1957);
McKesson & Robbins, SEC Accounting Release No. 19, at 30 (1940); S.
LEVY, AccouNTANTs' LEGAL REsPONsIBILITY 45 (1954); Douglas & Bates,
The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171, 188 (1933).
26. See Securities Act §§ 11, 12(1)-(2); Exchange Act §§ 9(e),
18(a). Section 11(a)(4), for example, specifically provides that an
accountant may be liable for any errors or omissions in a registration
statement that he has certified.
27. The remedies provided were primarily buyers' remedies only.
They were not exhaustive, contained short statutes of limitations, and
generally provided defendants with a large number of defenses. Pros-
pects, supra note 19, at 1121.
28. See note 5 supra. See also Prospects, supra note 19, at 1121.
29. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa.
1946). See Comment, Civil Liability Under Section lob and Rule lob-5:
A Suggestion for Replacing the Doctrine o0l Privity, 74 YALE L.J. 658 n.4
(1965) [hereinafter cited as Civil Liability], for a detailed list of cir-
cuits that have recognized implied liability. See also Ruder, Civil Lia-
bility Under Rule 10b-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw.
U.L. REV. 627, 687-90 (1963).
30. See, e.g., Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961); Los
Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch. v. SEC, 264 F.2d 199 (9th Cir.
1959); Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 437-38 (2d Cir. 1943),
cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1944); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F.
Supp. 798, 802 (E.D. Pa. 1946); S. LEvy, supra note 25, at 7. Compare
Geller v. Transamerica Corp., 53 F. Supp. 625 (D. Del. 1943), affd per
curiam, 151 F.2d 534 (3d Cir. 1945) (common law deceit action dis-
missed), with Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 71 F. Supp. 457 (D. Del.
1947) (same common law count dismissed, but § 10 (b) count sustained).
See generally Prospects, supra note 19, at 1.122.
31. Meisel v. North Jersey Trust Co., 218 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y.
1963); Donovan Inc. v. Taylor, 136 F. Supp. 522 (N.D. Cal. 1955); Joseph
v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1951),
aff'd per curiam, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952).
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jected in modern actions.3 2
Although the securities Acts thus made certain practices, in-
cluding forms of nondisclosure, 3 actionable, only a few cases
have arisen involving nondisclosure of after-acquired informa-
tion.34  Commentators have suggested that anyone who has
made a statement which he knows others are relying on must
disclose any after-acquired information showing the original
statement to be false or misleading,35 but the courts have not
uniformly accepted this view. One court held an accounting
firm liable when, one month after issuing a report on a com-
pany's financial position, the accountants presented, to the com-
pany only, a detailed report which indicated that the original
report did not present a true picture of the company's financial
position.36 However, another court ruled that an accountant is
under no duty to disclose developments occurring after certifi-
cation.
37
In the instant case, the court rejected the accountant's claim
that its duty to the investing public terminated once it certi-
fied the relevant balance sheets. Recognizing that in modern
business practices the doctrine of caveat emptor no longer justi-
fies a defendant's nondisclosure of essential information, the
court extended an accountant's potential liability in two ways.
First, at common law, Fischer dispensed with any requirement
32. See, e.g., Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307 F.2d
242 (6th Cir. 1962); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d
Cir. 1951); Miller v. Bargain City U.S.A., Inc., 229 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa.
1964); Cooper v. North Jersey Trust Co., 226 F. Supp. 972, 978 (S.D.N.Y.
1964); Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963);
Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). See gen-
erally Civil Liability, supra note 29, at 658, 663-65.
33. See the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77a, and the Exchange Act,
15 U.S.C. § 78a, for specific provisions. In addition, judicial interpre-
tation has broadened the prohibitions. See, e.g., Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (corporate directors'
purchase of stock without disclosure of sale of corporate assets illegal
under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5).
34. E.g., Shonts v. Hirliaman, 28 F. Supp. 478 (S.D. Cal. 1939).
35. S. LEVY, supra note 25, at 48 (suggesting that an accountant
should be under a duty to disclose events occurring after certification);
W. PRossEs, supra note 9, at 711.
36. State St. Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E.2d 416 (1938).
37. Shonts v. Hirliaman, 28 F. Supp. 478 (S.D. Cal. 1939). The
decision has been severely criticized. 3 L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION
1731-34 (2d ed. 1961); Bradley, Auditor's Liability and the Need for
Increased Accounting Uniformity, 30 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 898, 914
(1965); Rappaport, Accountants' Responsibility for Events Occurring
After the Statement Date, 95 J. AccouNmTcY 332, 333 (1953); 38 Micx.
L. REv. 1103 (1940); 50 YAL L.J. 98 (1940).
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of privity or financial interest on the part of defendant and,
more importantly, permitted the action to proceed without any
allegations or proof of intent to defraud. 38 Second, by allowing
the statutory action, the court expanded the class of potential
section 10(b) defendants,3 9 indicating the trend away from the
older authority requiring an allegation of gain on the part of
defendant 0 or a "semblance of privity.141 The court did, how-
ever, recognize that at this stage of the litigation it would be
improper to enunciate the exact extent of the accountant's ex-
panded liability.
42
In ruling that a common law cause of action exists, the
Fischer court has shifted the emphasis from the inappropriate
concept of privity and the traditional, though often fictional,
search for "intent" to newer, more objective standards, namely,
the impact of the nondisclosure on investors and the duty im-
posed by the demands of "good faith and common honesty.
'4 3
Under this impact test defendants vrill be held liable if the
plaintiff's damage results from reliance on the misrepresenta-
tion, whether or not defendants were actually a party to the
transaction from which the damage arose.4 4 Under the impact
test the Fischer facts are clearly actionable. The accountant
made a representation that it knew others would rely on, and
the subsequent nondisclosure of the after-acquired information
made that reliance detrimental. But the adoption of this im-
pact test in turn necessitates the abandonment of subjective con-
siderations of intent. If the basis of responsibility is to be the
impact of the misrepresentation, it should be irrelevant whether
38. Intent to defraud is one of the standard requirements of a de-
ceit action. See note 14 supra.
39. 266 F. Supp. at 190.
40. E.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y.
1966); Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962);
Cady, Roberts & Co. v. SEC, 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
41. See authorities cited note 31 suprc.
42. Among the questions the court explicity recognized but left
unanswered were the length of time the duty to disclose after-acquired
information lasts, to whom disclosure should be made, and how such
disclosure should be made. 266 F. Supp. at 188-89.
43. Id. at 186, 188.
44. Parties to a business transaction have long been under a com-
mon law duty to disclose information acquired subsequent to a repre-
sentation but prior to the consumation of the transaction. See, e.g.,
Fitzgerald v. McFadden, 88 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1937); Loewer v. Harris,
57 F. 368 (2d Cir. 1893); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or TORTS § 551(2) (e)
(Tent. Draft No. 12, April 27, 1966). The Fischer court found no reason
for distinguishing between the two situations since the ultimate result of
the misrepresentation is the same. 266 F. Supp. at 186.
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or not defendant intended to convey a false impression. By
requiring the accountant to conform to the standard of "good
faith and common honesty," the court has provided a criterion
capable of objective determination 45 and has taken a logical step
toward expanding an accountant's common law liability.46
The similar extension of section 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5 lia-
bility is also a logical expansion. It furthers the underlying
theme in federal securities regulation of full disclosure.47 The
accountant's duty to correct a mistaken impression is at least as
great as that of an attorney,48 and the SEC has ruled that an
attorney's failure to correct a report to the Commission that he
knew to be false and misleading constituted unethical and im-
proper professional conduct.49 A requirement of privity, gain,
or conspiracy would prevent drawing the logical conclusion of
this analogy and also unduly constrict the broad protection de-
sired.50 The rejection of this requirement and imposition of
liability on the accountant for nondisclosure of after-acquired
information will not only further the contemplated statutory
protection, but will also increase the investing public's confi-
dence in the accountant's representations in general.5 1
Although this case may never reach a final adjudication,
the court has nevertheless provided a foundation for the exten-
sion of accountants' liability. In arriving at a final decision, the
court will have to balance the conflicting interest of the public
in protecting investors who rely on professional representations
against the possibility of disproportionately great liability for
accountants. Fischer seems to indicate that the balance is in
favor of the investors and, indeed, this has been the trend in
45. "Good faith and common honesty" is the standard long imposed
on parties to a contract in a normal business transaction. See, e.g.,
Loewer v. Harris, 57 F. 368, 373 (2d Cir. 1893).
46. Unfortunately, the court weakened its holding that intent need
not be shown by deciding that if that rationale were unacceptable intent
should alternatively be presumed. 266 F. Supp. at 188.
47. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186
(1963); Prospects, supra note 19, at 1120. See also Wilko v. Swan, 346
U.S. 427, 430-31 (1953); Columbia Gen. Inv. Corp. v. SEC, 265 F.2d 559
(5th Cir. 1959); Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 437 (2d Cir.
1943); Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Bond Co., 187 F. Supp.
14 (W.D. Ky. 1960).
48. American Fin. Co., 40 S.E.C. 1043, 1049 (1962).
49. Morris MacSchwebel, 40 S.E.C. 347 (1960).
50. See Miller v. Bargain City, U.S.A., Inc., 229 F. Supp. 33, 37(E.D. Pa. 1964).
51. See S. LEVY, supra note 25, at 4-5. See also Statement by Car-
man Blough, Research Director of the American Institute of Account-
ants, quoted in Carey, Editorial, 82 J. ACCOUNTANCY 449, 453 (1946).
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